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More Than the Camel's Nose: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act as Bad
News for Lawyers, Their Clients, and the Public
TIMOTHY P. CHINARIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Business executives, accountants, lawyers, and the general public have
shown great interest in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("the Act") that was passed by
Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush in 2002.1
Designed as securities legislation, the Act reaches into areas of lawyer con-
duct, and the regulation of that lawyer conduct, that previously were the
domain primarily of state supreme courts. Lawyers, law firms, and bar
organizations have recognized that the concept of what it means to be an
ethical lawyer has been altered by the Act. Related developments spawned by
the Act's passage will continue to change the ethical landscape for many
lawyers, even those who do not practice securities law.
This article offers an overview of this important area by asking and
briefly answering three questions. First, where did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
come from? Second, what is the Act? Third, and most importantly for our
purposes, why should lawyers care about the Act and its related develop-
ments?
II. WHERE DID THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT COME FROM?
High-profile corporate scandals involving securities and the securities
markets have generated much discussion and controversy in the past few
years. Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco,
and even not-so-happy homemaker Martha Stewart have all entered our collec-
tive consciousness and become symbolic of perceived shortcomings in corpor-
ate governance and integrity.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2 was passed in response to these incidents of
corporate misconduct. Congress passed the Act on July 25, 2002, by an
almost unanimous vote. Five days later, on July 30, 2002, President Bush
* Associate Dean for Information Resources and Professor of Law, Thomas Goode Jones School
of Law, Faulkner University. J.D., University ofTexas 1984; M.L.I.S., Florida State University, 1996; B.S.,
Florida State University, 1977.
1. A June 29, 2005 search for "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" located more than 10,000 documents in
Westlaw's "all news" database, approximately 6,700 documents in Westlaw's legal periodicals database,
and a whopping 878,000 documents on the popular Internet search engine Google.
2. The Act was sponsored by Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-Maryland) and Representative Michael
Oxley (R-Ohio). Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Sta. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.A.).
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2845396 
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signed it into law. His signing statement noted that the Act "adopts tough new
provisions to deter and punish corporate and accounting fraud and corruption,
ensure justice for wrongdoers, and protect the interests of workers and share-
holders." Although not mentioned by the president, the Act also affects the
professional responsibilities of lawyers in a variety of ways.
III. WHAT IS THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT?
A. Generally
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act brings major changes to the laws governing
publicly traded securities. The Act is codified in titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
of the United States Code3 and may be accessed at various Internet sites.4 The
Act establishes or strengthens regulations that apply to corporate "issuers"5 of
publicly traded securities, as well as to directors, officers, employees, audi-
tors, and attorneys of issuers. Many of these changes are in the form of
requiring the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") to issue final
rules implementing the broader directives contained in the Act. Some of the
key provisions contained in or required by the Act are highlighted below.
B. Stronger Corporate Governance and Oversight
1. The audit committee of an issuer's board of directors must be
"directly responsible" for hiring, compensation, and oversight of the
outside auditor. It also must have authority to hire independent
counsel and other advisers "as it determines necessary to carry out
its duties."6
2. Each member of an issuer's audit committee must be an indepen-
dent member of the board of directors.7
3. Specific citations are provided throughout these materials as those sections are discussed.
4. See, e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf;
http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/SOact/soact.pdf (last visited June 29, 2005).
5. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act generally defines an "issuer" as "an issuer (as defined in section 3 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c)), the securities of which are registered under section
12 of that Act (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of that Act (15 U.S.C.
78o(d)) or that files or has filed a registration statement that has not yet become effective under the
Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.), and that it has not withdrawn." 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201(a)(7).
For purposes of the attorney professional standards section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the definition of
"issuer" also includes "any person controlled by an issuer, where an attorney provides legal services to such
person on behalf of, or at the behest, or for the benefit of the issuer, regardless of whether the attorney is
employed or retained by the issuer" but does not include "a foreign government issuer." 17 C.F.R. §
205.2(h).
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301(m)(2) (2005).
7. Id. at § 301(m)(3XA).
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3. Each audit committee must establish a procedure that allows the
issuer's employees to anonymously submit their "concerns regard-
ing questionable accounting or auditing matters."8
C. Increased Outside Auditor Independence
1. Outside auditors are prohibited from performing certain non-audit
services contemporaneously with an audit, including:
a.) bookkeeping or other services relating to the audit client's
accounting or financial statements;
b.) design and implementation of financial information systems;
c.) appraisal or valuation services;
d.) management or human resources functions; and
e.) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit.9
2. The lead and review partners of an auditing firm must be changed
after performing auditing services for an issuer "in each of the 5
previous fiscal years.""l
3. A new conflict of interest regulation provides that an auditing firm
may not perform auditing services for an issuer for at least one year
after any audit firm employee who participated in auditing the
issuer has been hired as a key financial officer for the issuer."
4. A new Public Accounting Oversight Board has been created to
oversee the audit of publicly traded companies. 2
D. Enhanced or Additional Corporate Disclosures
1. Chief executive officers and chief financial officers of companies
filing quarterly or annual reports under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 must include specific certifications in each of those reports.
Among other things, these officers must certify that:
a.) the officer has reviewed the report;
b.) based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain
any untrue statement of material facts or omit material facts
necessary to make the report not misleading;
8. Id. at § 301(mX4XB).
9. Id. at § 201(a).
10. Id. at § 2030).
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 206(1) (2005).
12. Id. at § 101(a).
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c.) based on the officer's knowledge, the financial information in
the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the company;
d.) the officer is responsible for, and has evaluated the
effectiveness of, the company's internal controls; and
e.) the officer has disclosed to the company's auditors and board
of directors' audit committee all significant deficiencies in the
internal controls and any fraud involving management or
employees who play a role in internal controls.'
3
2. Chief executive officers and chief financial officers of issuers also
must make specific certifications in each periodic report filed by the
issuer that contains financial statements. These officers must
certify that:
a.) the report fully complies with named sections of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
b.) the information in the report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the issuer. Knowingly or willfully filing a false certification
is punishable by stiff criminal penalties (up to 10 years
imprisonment and a fine of up to $1,000,000 for knowingly
filing a false certification, and up to 20 years imprisonment
and a fine of up to $5,000,000 for willfully filing a false certi-
fication). 14
3. Issuers must make "plain English" disclosures to the public "on a
rapid and current basis" of any additional information "concerning
material changes in the financial condition or operations of the
issuer." This includes any "trend and qualitative information" that
the SEC by rule determines "is necessary or useful for the protec-
tion of investors and in the public interest."' 5
4. Annual and quarterly reports of publicly traded companies must
disclose all material off-balance sheet transactions, obligations, and
relationships that "may have a material current or future effect" on
the company's financial condition. 6
13. Id. at § 302(a).
14. Id. at § 906.
15. Id. at § 409(1).
16. Id. at § 401(a)(j).
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5. Each issuer must disclose in its periodic reports whether its audit
committee has at least one member who is a "financial expert" (as
defined by the SEC). If the audit committee does not have such an
expert, the report must disclose the reasons why it does not. 7
E. Greater Insider Accountability
1. The reporting deadline for persons who are required to disclose
changes of beneficial ownership of securities" has been moved up
to the second business day after the transaction (instead of the
current requirement of the tenth day of the month after the trade
took place). 9
2. The conflict of interest provisions in the securities laws have been
strengthened to generally prohibit personal loans to any director or
officer of a publicly traded company.2"
3. Issuers must disclose in their periodic reports whether they have
adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers. If an issuer
has not adopted a code of ethics, the issuer must disclose the
reasons why it has not.
2'
F. Assessment of Internal Corporate Controls
Annual reports must include an internal control report that, among other
things, contains "an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of
the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures
of the issuer for financial reporting." The issuer's outside auditor must attest
to and report on this assessment.22
17. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407(a) (2005).
18. Such persons include any person who is "directly or indirectly the beneficial owner ofmore than
10 percent of any class of [registered] equity security" and any person who is a "director or an officer of
the issuer of such security." Id. at 403(aX1).
19. Id. at § 403(a)(2)(B).
20. Id. at § 402(a)(k)(1).
21. Id. at § 406(a).
22. Id. at § 404.
2005]
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G. Greater Civil and Criminal Penalties for Violations
1. The Act establishes criminal penalties for:
a.) knowingly destroying, altering, or falsifying documents with
the intent to obstruct a federal investigation or bankruptcy
case;
23
b.) knowingly and willfully violating new requirements for
retention of corporate audit records;
24
c.) corruptly altering, destroying, mutilating, or concealing a
document or record with the intent to impair its integrity or use
in an official proceeding;25 and
d.) knowingly defrauding someone in connection with publicly
traded securities or fraudulently obtaining money in
connection with the purchase or sale of publicly traded
securities."
2. Penalties for willful violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by natural persons are increased from up to $1,000,000 and/or
10 years imprisonment to up to $5,000,000 and/or 20 years
imprisonment. For other than natural persons, the penalties go from
up to $2,500,000 to up to $25,000,000.27
3. Civil sanctions have also been enhanced:
a.) the statute of limitations for securities fraud has been
lengthened to 2 years after discovery of the facts constituting
the violation or 5 years after the violation, whichever comes
earlier; 28 and
b.) debts resulting from someone's violations of securities laws
are no longer dischargeable in bankruptcy.29
H. Whistleblower Protection for Corporate Employees and Others
1. Employees of publicly traded companies who are discharged,
demoted, or otherwise harassed or discriminated against as a result
of providing information or assistance in an investigation or pro-
ceeding regarding alleged violations of securities laws (or other
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802(a) (2005).
24. Id. at § 802(a)(1).
25. Id. at§ 1102(c)(1).
26. Id. at § 807.
27. Id. at§ 1106(2).
28. Id. at § 804(b).
29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 803(19) (2005).
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federal laws prohibiting fraud on stockholders) now have a civil
cause of action against the employer. Remedies may include com-
pensatory damages, reinstatement, and litigation costs and fees.3"
2. Any knowing and intentional retaliation against any person who
provides law enforcement officials with "truthful information rela-
ting to the commission or possible commission of any Federal
offense" is punishable by a fine or up to 10 years in prison. Retalia-
tion can include interference with someone's "lawful employment
or livelihood." This provision protects anyone, not just employees
of an issuer."
I. Heightened Attorney Responsibilities
1. Portions of the Act reflect the assumption that the conduct of
issuers' lawyers contributed to the problems that led to the Act's
passage. The Act addressed the perceived need to more strictly
regulate these lawyers' conduct by directing the SEC to issue rules,
in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting
forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the
representation of issuers, including a rule-
a.) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation
of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar viola-
tion by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the
equivalent thereof); and
b.) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial mea-
sures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the
attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the
board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the
board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed
directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of
directors.32
2. The rules considered and adopted by the SEC in compliance with
the Act's directives are discussed in Section IV below.
30. Id. at § 806(cX2).
31. Id. at§ l107(e).
32. Id. at § 307.
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3. It is unlawful for any officer or director of an issuer, "or any other
person acting under the direction thereof," to take any action to
fraudulently influence, manipulate, or mislead outside auditors.33
IV. WHY SHOULD LAWYERS CARE ABOUT THE ACT AND RELATED
DEVELOPMENTS?
A. Generally
Only a true Rip Van Winkle of a lawyer could not be aware that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is now the law of the land. Fewer lawyers, however,
might appreciate the various levels on which the Act and its related
developments could affect their practices and the legal profession. Some of
these effects are direct and immediate, while others are less obvious or may
present only potential concerns that might never be realized. These areas of
concern-and, in many cases, risk-for lawyers are discussed below.
B. New Obligations for Lawyers' Clients
As mentioned in Section III above, the Act creates or revises a number
of obligations on the part of issuers and the officers, directors, auditors, and
"insiders" of issuers. In order to properly advise their clients, lawyers for
these affected entities and individuals must understand and be able to apply
these new or changed regulations. The Act has raised the stakes by toughen-
ing the criminal and civil penalties for violations. Lawyers who fail to
properly advise their clients regarding these regulations might open them-
selves up to legal malpractice claims.
C. New Obligations for Lawyers Practicing Before the SEC
Probably the most direct effect of the Act on the regulation of lawyer
conduct springs from its section 307, which required the SEC to "issue rules,
in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing
before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers." Specifi-
cally, the Commission was directed to promulgate rules requiring that such
lawyers report evidence of"a material violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the [issuing] company or any agent
thereof' to the client company's chief legal counsel ("CLO") or chief execu-
tive officer ("CEO"). If the CLO or CEO does not "appropriately respond"
to the lawyer's report, the lawyer must report the evidence to the audit
33. Id. at § 303(a).
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committee of the board of directors, to a committee of independent directors,
or to the board itself.34 This procedure has been called "reporting up the
corporate ladder." Under this "up the ladder" approach, the lawyer's com-
munications are made to appropriate officials within the corporate client, and
so should remain protected by any applicable privilege.
The SEC responded to this legislative mandate by publishing for
comment 2 proposed rules. The first rule, which may be called the "up the
ladder rule," has now been finalized and is codified at 17 C.F.R. Part 205." 5
(The final rule as adopted by the SEC alternatively permits a corporation's
lawyer to make the required reports to an established "qualified legal
compliance committee.")36 Having been adopted as required by section 307,
this rule has the force and effect of law.37 The second proposed rule, which
may be called the "noisy withdrawal rule," is still pending; it has been the
target of much criticism and may or may not be approved in its proposed form.
These two rules, and the concerns that they cause for many lawyers, are
discussed below.
1. The "Up the Ladder Rule"
Simply stated, the "up the ladder rule" is designed to require in-house
and outside lawyers who become aware of corporate wrongdoing to report it
up the corporate chain of command. If the lawyer receives an appropriate
response at any point along the line, his or her duty has been satisfied.
(Alternatively, if the lawyer has reported the material violation to the client
corporation's qualified legal compliance committee, the lawyer's reporting
obligations have been satisfied and the lawyer has no further obligation to
assess the issuer's response to the report).38
If a lawyer who initially reported to the CLO or CEO does not receive an
appropriate response within a reasonable time, the lawyer must "explain his
or her reasons" to the CLO, the CEO, and the directors to whom the lawyer
reported. At that point, the "up the ladder rule"permits, but does not require,
the lawyer to take a significant additional step. The rule states that the lawyer
then "may reveal to the Commission, without the issuer's consent, confidential
information related to the representation to the extent the attorney reasonably
34. The exact language of this part of section 307(2) of the Act is quoted in Section 1..1., above.
35. 17 C.F.R. Part 205, available at http://www.sunethics.com/sox-attystds.htm (last visited June
29, 2005).
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c)(1) (2005).
37. Id. at § 205.6(a) provides: "A violation of this part by any attorney appearing and practicing
before the Commission in the representation of an issuer shall subject such attorney to the civil penalties
and remedies for a violation of the federal securities laws available to the Commission in an action brought
by the Commission thereunder."
38. Id. at § 205.3(c)(1).
2005]
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believes necessary" in order to: (1) "prevent the issuer from committing a
material violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of the issuer or investors"; (2) prevent the issuer from
committing certain criminal acts (e.g., perjury); or (3) "rectify the conse-
quences of a material violation by the issuer that caused, or may cause, sub-
stantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in
the furtherance of which the attorney's services were used" (emphasis
supplied).39
One of the rule's underlying premises is a concept familiar to corporate
lawyers: their client is the organization, rather than the individuals within it.4"
This principle has long been expressed in ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.13(a), which provides: "A lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents." Unfortunately, once one gets beyond this starting point, appli-
cation of the rule is not at all simple. Several portions of the rule's language
leave important issues open to interpretation and, thus, to uncertainty.
First, the rule applies to "attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission in the representation of an issuer" (emphasis supplied). While
this includes actually representing an issuer in a proceeding or filing before
the SEC, the rule stretches the definition far enough to include providing
advice or preparation assistance regarding any document that is expected to
be filed with the SEC.4 This could mean, for example, that a lawyer who
merely provides a summary of a corporate client's recent litigation activity for
inclusion in one of the company's required reports to the SEC has thereby
become subject to these regulations.42 Furthermore, a lawyer need not even
personally engage in any of these activities to be held to be practicing before
the SEC. The rule expressly states that the supervisor of a lawyer who
39. Id. at § 205.3(d)(2)(iii).
40. Id. at § 205.3(a) provides:
An attorney appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation of an
issuer owes his or her professional and ethical duties to the issuer as an organization. That
the attorney may work with and advise the issuer's officers, directors, or employees in the
course of representing the issuer does not make such individuals the attorney's clients.
41. Id. at § 205.2(a)(1)(iii) provides that appearing and practicing before the SEC means:
Providing advice in respect of the United States securities laws or the Commission's rules
or regulations thereunder regarding any document that the attorney has notice will be filed
with or submitted to, or incorporated into any document that will be filed with or submitted
to, the Commission, including the provision of such advice in the context of preparing, or
participating in the preparation of, any such document.
42. See Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section and the Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct of the California State Bar, Ethics Alert: The New SEC Attorney Conduct
Rules v. California 's Duty of Confidentiality, available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/SEC-
ethics-alert.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
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actually engages in these activities also will be deemed to be practicing before
the Commission. 3 If these types of indirect interaction with the SEC subject
lawyers to the Act's requirements, its sweep is broad indeed. One might
question whether such a broad definition goes beyond the mandate of Section
307 of the Act by purporting to regulate lawyers who are only tangentially
involved in securities compliance matters (and who might have limited
experience in the area)."
Such an expansive view of which lawyers are required to take affirmative
action in this area is quite outside of the norm of the state bar ethics rules that
require lawyers to take action that may be potentially adverse to a client or is
outside of the scope of what the lawyer was engaged to do for the client.
These rules typically affect only those lawyers who are directly involved in
the particular situation. Importantly, these rules usually are triggered by a
lawyer's "knowledge" of certain information.45 In contrast, the "up the ladder
rule" is triggered when a lawyer merely "becomes aware of evidence of a
material violation by the issuer. "46
Second, the reporting standard is awkwardly phrased. A lawyer is
required to report up the ladder when he or she has "material evidence of a
material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation" by the client company. Evidence of a material violation is defined,
using a grammatically questionable double negative, to mean "credible evi-
dence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances,
for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably
likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur"
(emphasis supplied).47 This may mean that a lawyer has the duty to report up
the ladder only when there can be no reasonable question about whether a
violation has occurred or will occur, or it may mean that something less
triggers the reporting requirement.
43. 17 C.F.R. § 205.4(b) (2005) provides in pertinent part: "To the extent a subordinate attorney
appears and practices before the Commission in the representation of an issuer, that subordinate attorneys
supervisory attorneys also appear and practice before the Commission." Of course, this includes the
issuer's chief legal counsel. Id. at § 205.4(a).
44. The SEC's assurances that it will not use this broad definition as a trap for unwary lawyers
provides little comfort. See, e.g., "Lawyers Anxiously Discuss SEC's New Focus on Performance of Their
Professional Duties," 20 LAW. MAN. PROF'L CONDUCT 597 (comments of SEC Deputy Enforcement Dir.
Linda Thomsen). Such determinations necessarily will be made in hindsight, from the viewpoint of the
agency rather than from that of the lawyer who was facing an uncertain situation at the time. The author's
experience in the lawyer disciplinary arena shows that these types of "20/20 hindsight" determinations
rarely work to the lawyer's benefit.
45. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2005); id. at R. 3.3(a).
46. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2005).
47. Id. at § 205.2(e).
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Third, it is not at all clear what will be considered an "appropriate
response" for purposes of a lawyer-or the SEC-being satisfied that the
lawyer has complied with his or her obligations. Although the rule makes a
lengthy attempt to define this term," it is clear that a lawyer who is accused
by the SEC of failing to fulfill his or her duties under this rule will be open to
second-guessing about whether the response to the lawyer's action really was
an "appropriate" one.
A fourth concern is that the language of the rule might muddy the waters
in connection with breach of fiduciary duty claims. The rule requires a lawyer
to report "material violations," and in turn a material violation is defined to
include "a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under United States
federal or state law." '49 It has been suggested that this might bring state law
issues of fiduciary duties under the umbrella of the federal securities laws,
which previously was not the case.5 °
Finally, the most controversial provision of the "up the ladder rule"
concerns the interplay between the rule and a lawyer's duty of confidentiality
under the rules of professional conduct5' applicable in the jurisdiction where
the lawyer is licensed. The rule expressly permits a lawyer to disclose
confidential information to the SEC if the lawyer's attempts to prevent or
rectify a material violation through the up the ladder approach are not met
with an "appropriate response" within a reasonable period of time. The
problem lawyers might face is that this provision is inconsistent with the
confidentiality provisions of some states' rules of professional conduct.
The rules of professional conduct of some states currently permit, or even
require, a lawyer to reveal otherwise confidential information to prevent the
commission of a future crime or fraud. A few permit or require disclosure of
confidences to rectify the consequences of a client's past crime or fraud, but
states with such rules are in the distinct minority.52 A lawyer who chooses to
make a disclosure of confidential information as permitted by the SEC's "up
the ladder rule" might be violating his or her confidentiality obligations as
established in the rules of professional conduct for the jurisdiction in which
48. See id. at § 205.2(b).
49. Id. at § 205.2(i).
50. See Mannino, Edward, Lawyer Liability for Client Fraud: The Impact of Enron, WorldCom,
and Other Corporate Wrongdoing, 14 PRACTICAL LITIGATOR, July 2003, at 27, 30.
51. The term "rules of professional conduct" is used here generically. Most states have adopted a
version of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, typically with some state-specific modifications.
See http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha-states.html (last visited June 29, 2005).
52. A comprehensive list of the states that permit or require disclosures to prevent future crimes or
frauds or to rectify past ones is compiled at Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility, n.89 (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.orgfbuslaw/corporate
responsibility/finalreport.pdf (last visited June 29, 2005).
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the lawyer is licensed to practice law. This, in turn, could lead to civil liability
for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty if damages result from the lawyer's
disclosure.
Through the "up the ladder rule," the SEC is actively encouraging
lawyers to disclose confidential information to the possible detriment of their
clients. This necessarily will have a chilling effect on the attorney-client
relationship, at least from the standpoint of the client - which means that
clients will be less likely to share information with the very legal counsel who
could help them comply with the law. This effect, of course, is at odds with
the intended purposes of the Act.
The SEC takes the position that the SEC regulations are federal law that
preempts any contrary state law provisions. This position has yet to be tested
in court. In the meantime, however, at least 2 state bar organizations have
warned their members that the state rules of professional conduct, not the
SEC's rules, must govern their conduct.53 Fortunately for lawyers in these
states (and others), the confidentiality disclosures permitted by the "up the
ladder rule" are permissive rather than mandatory disclosures-a lawyer
"may" disclose, but is not required to do so. This fact helps minimize the
problems that flow from inconsistent rules. Such an escape valve, however,
might no longer exist if the SEC decides to adopt its proposed "noisy
withdrawal rule."
2. The Proposed "Noisy Withdrawal Rule"
The concerns that many lawyers have expressed about operation of the
"up the ladder rule" are dwarfed by the outcry over the SEC's proposed "noisy
withdrawal rule." At the same time the SEC published for comment the rule
that ultimately was adopted as the "up the ladder rule," it sought comments on
a rule that went even further in terms of disclosure of confidential
information-the "noisy withdrawal rule."54 That comment period was later
formally extended to April 7,2003, after the SEC added a proposed alternative
reporting procedure in response to some earlier comments on its original
proposal." The SEC has yet to take final action on the "noisy withdrawal
rule" or its alternative.
53. These states are California and Washington. See supra note 43, and "Interim Formal Ethics
Opinion re: The Effect of the SEC's Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations on Washington Attorneys'Obligations
Under the RPCs," adopted by the Washington State Bar Association Board of Governors on July 26,2003,
available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/formalopinion.doc (last visited Apr. 3,2004).
54. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,324,
6,326-27 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3).
55. Id.
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The proposed "noisy withdrawal rule" specifically addresses the duty of
a lawyer who has reported a material violation up the ladder but has not
received an appropriate response within a reasonable time. 6 The proposed
rule distinguishes between outside lawyers and in-house counsel. 7 The
following duties apply to lawyers who initially reported the evidence of
material violations to the CLO or CEO; they do not apply if the lawyer
reported to the client's qualified legal compliance committee.5"
In situations where the material violation has not yet occurred or is
ongoing, and is likely to cause substantial financial or property harm, outside
counsel must withdraw from the representation, promptly give written notice
of the withdrawal to the SEC "indicating that the withdrawal was based on
professional considerations," and "promptly disaffirm[ing] to the Com-
mission" any opinion or representation "that the attorney has prepared or
assisted in preparing and that the attorney reasonably believes is or may be
materially false or misleading."59 The proposed rule, however, does not
specify the scope of any such withdrawal. For example, would withdrawal be
required from all matters the lawyer is handling for that client, or only from
the specific matter in question?
In situations where the material violation has not yet occurred or is
ongoing, and is likely to cause substantial financial or property harm, in-house
counsel are not required to resign their employment, but they must notify the
SEC in writing of their intent to disaffirm an opinion or representation "that
the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and that the attorney
reasonably believes is or may be materially false or misleading," and then
must follow through and promptly disaffirm in writing.60
In situations where the material violation has already occurred and is not
ongoing, the duties referenced above, for both outside and in-house counsel,
are permissive rather than mandatory (the proposed rule uses "may" rather
than "shall").6 Additionally, any lawyer hired to replace a lawyer who has
withdrawn from the representation must be informed by the issuer's CLO that
the prior lawyer withdrew "based on professional considerations."62
As might be expected, many lawyers and lawyer groups are concerned
that, if adopted, this "noisy withdrawal rule" could place a lawyer who
practices before the SEC in a situation where complying with the SEC-
56. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)).
57. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 205 (d)(l)(i)-(ii)).
58. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(d)(1)-(2)).
59. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(d)(l)(i)(A)-(B)).
60. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,324,6,326-
27 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(d)(l)(ii)(A)-(B)).
61. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(d)(2)(i)-(ii)).
62. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(d)(1)(iii)).
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mandated disclosure of confidential information would violate the rules of
professional conduct applicable in the state where the lawyer is licensed.
And, as noted in Section IVC.I above, some state bar organizations are
notably unswayed by the SEC's preemption arguments-thus placing these
lawyers in an even more uncomfortable position.
A very controversial provision in the proposed rule states: "The
notification required to the Commission prescribed by this paragraph (d) does
not breach the attorney-client privilege. 63 The law in this area, however, is
not as well-settled as the SEC apparently believes. There have been instances
where a corporation's disclosure of otherwise-privileged information to the
SEC, even pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, has been deemed to be a
waiver of the corporation's attorney-client or workproduct privileges for other
purposes.' A lawyer who makes a disclosure in reliance on the SEC's
position could end up losing an important privilege that otherwise might
protect a client.
The SEC apparently attempted to address some of these concerns by
seeking comment on an alternative reporting proposal. This alternative does
not require the reporting lawyer to notify the SEC of the lawyer's withdrawal
from the representation or to disaffirm any opinions or documents the lawyer
provided to the SEC.65 (The lawyer's withdrawal from the representation
would still be required.) Instead, the issuer would be required to promptly
give the SEC written notice of the lawyer's withdrawal "and the circum-
stances related thereto."66 This alternative proposal also would permit, but not
require, the lawyer to inform the SEC that the lawyer had given the required
notice to the issuer in the event that the issuer has not so notified the SEC.67
Even this alternative proposal presents problems for lawyers and their
clients. At a minimum, it puts the lawyer in the position of policing the client
to see if the client has appropriately satisfied the SEC's interpretation of the
reporting requirements. Under either proposal, the attorney-client relationship
would be negatively affected. Clients will be less willing to confide in their
63. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(3)).
64. See McKesson HBOC Inc. v. Super. Ct., 115 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1239 (Cal.App. 2004) (waiver
of attorney-client and work product privileges); United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487,497 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (waiver of work product privilege). But see Saito v. McKesson HBOC Inc., No. 18553, 2002 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 125, at *12, (Oct. 22, 2002, unreported (no waiver of work product privilege if a disclosing
party had a reasonable expectancy of privacy when it makes disclosure)); McKesson HBOC Inc. v. Adler,
562 S.E.2d 809, 812 (Ga. App. 2002) (no waiver of work product privilege, despite waiver of attorney-
client privilege due to disclosure).
65. Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Att'ys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,324, 6,329-30
(proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(e)).
66. Id.
67. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(f)).
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lawyers because they can expect that any notification of attorney withdrawal
in compliance with a "noisy withdrawal rule" would almost certainly trigger
an SEC investigation. Such an investigation, in turn, will result in adverse
market consequences for the issuer client, and perhaps potential litigation
against the client as well.
3. Regulatory Rule Changes in Other Areas of Law Practice
It is likely that the SEC' s willingness to aggressively regulate the conduct
of lawyers practicing before it, even to the extent of adopting regulations that
may conflict with state bar standards, will encourage other administrative
agencies to be bolder in this area. For example, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office has published for comment proposed Rules of Professional
Conduct that would replace its Code of Professional Responsibility.68
4. Changes to ABA and State Rules of Professional Conduct
One might ask how the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
square with the obligations imposed on lawyers by the Act and the related
SEC regulations. The ABA has scrambled to make its rules more responsive
to the concerns that prompted the passage of the Act. In a move with
potentially wide-ranging implications for many lawyers, in August 2003 the
American Bar Association reacted to the passage of the Act (and to the causes
that prompted the Act's passage) by amending two key provisions of its Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 1.13, "Organization as client," was amended to essentially require69
that a lawyer go up the corporate ladder to protect the interests of an
organizational client and to further provide that, if the corporate authorities are
unresponsive, the lawyer may (but is not required to) disclose confidential
information outside the corporate client, "but only if and to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the
organization" (emphasis supplied).7"
Perhaps more significantly, Rule 1.6, "Confidentiality of information,"
was revised to add new exceptions to a lawyer's duty of confidentiality.
Model Rule 1.6 now permits, but does not require, lawyers to reveal
confidential information in order to prevent a client "from committing a crime
68. See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office;
Proposed Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,442-562 (proposed Dec. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. Pts. 1, 2,
10 and 11), Dept. of Com. available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/68fr69442.pdf
(last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
69. The prior version of ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 encouraged but did not
require the "up the ladder" approach.
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13, n.1 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/new-rulel_ 13.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
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or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used
or is using the lawyer's services" and to "prevent, mitigate or rectify
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another" that has
resulted from the client's use of the lawyer's services in committing a crime.7
Many states are now reviewing their own rules of professional conduct
to determine whether their rules should be amended to adopt the ABA's Act-
related changes.72 States that do not currently have rules consistent with the
ABA's changes are likely to face pressure to conform.
5. Expanded Concerns about Lawyers' Liability
Does the Act, or the related SEC regulations, expand the bases on which
lawyers might be held liable to their clients-or others-for malpractice,
breach of fiduciary duty, or other civil or criminal claims? Careful analysis
indicates that the answer is "yes," despite the SEC's announced intention to
the contrary.
The rules already adopted by the SEC pursuant to Section 307 of the
Act73 state that "Nothing in this part [17 C.F.R. Part 205] is intended to, or
does, create a private right of action against any attorney, law firm, or issuer
based upon compliance or noncompliance with its provisions."74  This
language might sound comforting, but one must remember that the Preamble
to the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct (which has been adopted by many
states as part of their rules of professional conduct) says essentially the same
thing.75 Yet, courts have permitted plaintiffs in legal malpractice cases to use
the violation of a rule of professional conduct to support a malpractice claim.76
71. Id. at 1.6, n.2.
72. The ABA Joint Committee on Lawyer Regulation has established a web site that tracks states'
activity in response to the ABA "Ethics 2000 Commission" changes to the MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT; it is at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/jctrhome.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2004). Some of these
states are reviewing the Aug. 2003 changes prompted by the Act, as well.
73. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307 (2005).
74. 17 C.F.R. § 205.7 (2005).
75. The "Scope" portion of the Preamble states, in pertinent part:
Violation of a Rule [of Professional Conduct] should not itself give rise to a cause of action
against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has
been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other
nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The
Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating
conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, pmbl., § 20 (2002).
76. See Restatement (Third) Of the Law Governing Lawyers § 52, comment (f) and cases cited
thereunder. In Florida, for example, violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a cause
of action but may be used as "some evidence as negligence." Pressley v. Farley, 579 So.2d 160, 161 (Fla.
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No great imagination is needed to see that violations of the SEC's regulations
could be put to a similar use.
In terms of the duty of competent representation owed to clients, the Act
clearly creates new areas of concern for corporate lawyers. For example, if
a lawyer's failure to determine and report evidence of "material violations"
should redound to the detriment of the client or others, the lawyer could be
liable for malpractice or perhaps breach of fiduciary duty. Or, a lawyer's
disclosure of confidential client information in an attempt to comply with the
SEC's regulations could lead to a breach of fiduciary duty claim by the
corporation or its shareholders against the lawyer."
In-house lawyers for issuers have additional concerns of their own under
the Act. If an in-house lawyer participates (e.g., receives information, investi-
gates, advises, or takes part in disciplinary or other action) in the issuer's
action against an employee who is later deemed a "whistleblower" under the
Act, he or she may be liable for civil7" or criminal79 penalties.
Additionally, some of the Act's general provisions for liability would
apply to anyone, including outside or in-house counsel. For example, the Act
makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly destroy, alter, or falsify documents
with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation or bankruptcy case.8"
Finally, these concerns about the heightened likelihood of lawyer liability
are exacerbated by the fact that the Act's "reporting up" provisions might
actually result in a corporation's lawyer being less aware of critical infor-
mation than he or she might be now. The reporting obligations might under-
mine the necessary free flow of information between corporate representatives
and the corporation's lawyers. This result ill serves lawyers and their clients.
6. Other Effects within Law Firms and Corporate Legal
Departments
Perhaps on a positive note for lawyers, they are not excluded from the
protection of the "whistleblower" provisions of the Act. An in-house counsel
who suffers retaliation for providing the SEC with information about the
Dist. Ct. App. 1991). See also Gomez v. Hawkins Concrete Constr. Co., 623 F. Supp. 194, 199 (N.D. Fla.
1985); Oberson Invs., N.V. v. Angel, Cohen & Rogovin, 492 So.2d 1113, 1114 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986), quashed on other grounds 512 So.2d 192 (Fla. 1987).
77. This possibility is discussed in Ethics Alert: The New SEC Attorney Conduct Rules v.
California 's Duty of Confidentiality, supra note 42.
78. See Sarbanes-Oxicy Act of 2002 § 806 (2005).
79. See id. at § 1107.
80. Id. at § 802(a).
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corporate client's possible wrongdoing is authorized to bring an action against
the employer for civil remedies under Section 806 of the Act.8
Over the years, some in-house counsel have sued their employers under
state law retaliatory discharge claims, with mixed results. 2 The advent of the
statutory protection provided by the Act might strengthen the "public policy"
argument in favor of permitting in-house counsel to maintain these claims in
situations outside the scope of the Act's reach.
Similarly, an outside counsel who suffers adverse employment action at
the hands of his or her employer law firm in connection with reporting activity
contemplated by the Act is likely to assert that public policy supports the
existence of wrongful discharge liability on the part of the law firm.83
Ironically, the very first reported "whistleblower" case under the Act
involved lawyer conduct-albeit somewhat indirectly.84 After non-lawyer
David Welch was discharged from his position as a bank's chief financial
officer, he sued the bank under the retaliatory discharge provisions of the
Act." The bank's defense was that Mr. Welch was not fired for
whistleblowing activity, but for failing to meet with the bank's executives,
lawyers, and outside auditors without his personal counsel with him.86 The
bank asserted that its attorney-client privilege would be waived if Mr. Welch's
personal lawyer attended. 7 The author rendered an expert opinion to the
effect that the bank's position was spurious. The administrative law judge
ultimately decided in favor of Mr. Welch, ordering him reinstated to his
former position with back pay, in addition to awarding him fees and costs.88
7. Potential Effect on Attorney-Client Privilege
Some concerns regarding the effect that the SEC's "up the ladder rule"
and its proposed "noisy withdrawal rule" could have on the attorney-client
privilege are mentioned in Sections IVC. 1 and 2, above. It is apparent that the
81. Id. at § 806.
82. See, e.g., Overall, Lisa, Note, Retaliatory Discharge and In-House Counsel: A Comparative
Analysis of State Law in the Wake of the Tennessee Supreme Court's Decision in Crews v. Buckman
Laboratories, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 629 (2003); Marshall, Brenda, Note, In Search of Clarity: When Should
In-House Counsel Have the Right to Suefor Retaliatory Discharge, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 871 (2001).
83. Such a case might be brought under a claim similar to that asserted in Wieder v. Skala, 609
N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992) (lawyer discharged for allegedly failing to follow employing law firm's directives
and thereby violating professional ethics rules has cause of action against firm for breach of contract;
ethical practice of law is an implied term of the contract).
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Act and the related SEC rules are generating pressures that may chip away at
the time-honored protections offered by the attorney-client privilege.
The attorney-client privilege typically protects communications
concerning past acts about which a client (or potential client) seeks legal
advice. In contrast, the privilege does not apply to legal advice sought for the
purpose of committing a future crime or fraud. Disclosure of otherwise-
privileged communications can waive the privilege.89 Under the "up the
ladder rule," a lawyer may choose to make a disclosure concerning a client's
past acts in fear that someone may rely on it and suffer harm in the future,
which could result in a waiver of the privilege concerning that matter. The
"noisy withdrawal rule" can create privilege problems as well. When a lawyer
notifies the SEC of his or her withdrawal, the SEC is likely to seek proof of
the lawyer's compliance with the up-the-ladder requirements. This will put
pressure on the lawyer and the client to disclose otherwise-privileged material.
Furthermore, the SEC's alternative proposal would result in public disclosure
of the withdrawal "and the circumstances relating thereto," again possibly
resulting in loss of the privilege.9"
Additionally, regulated companies are getting increasing pressure from
government regulators to turn over privileged materials as a demonstration of
their "cooperation" with the government.9 Turning over these materials can
result in a waiver of the privilege on those materials, or even on all materials
relating to the same subject matter. This adds to the chilling effect that makes
company personnel less likely to disclose these things to the company's
lawyers in the first place.
Finally, considering the SEC's position that its regulations preempt any
contradictory state law, it is easy to imagine what might happen if the present
regulations do not have the desired effect of ending corporate wrongdoing.
The SEC might attempt expand the reach of its regulations, ostensibly under
the directives in Section 307 of the Act, in a way that further erodes the
attorney-client and work product privileges by requiring, for example, an
issuer's lawyer to report past violations by the issuer.
8. The "Big Gorilla"-The Push Toward Nationalization of
Lawyer Regulation
Perhaps the most far-reaching possible effect of the Act will be to
increase the pressure for a "nationalization" of lawyer regulation. As more
89. See Implementation of Standards of Prof'I Conduct for Att'ys, supra note 65.
90. Implementation of Standards of Prof I Conduct for Att'ys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,324, 6,327-28
(proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(3)).
91. See, e.g., "Lawyers Anxiously Discuss SEC's New Focus on Performance of Their Professional
Duties," 20 ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct 597.
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federal agencies attempt to promulgate regulations that are inconsistent with
state rules of professional conduct, the calls for a national standard of lawyer
conduct will grow louder.9 2 The effect of such calls clearly has been felt in
the area of "multijurisdictional" law practice-following the ABA's urging,
many states are rushing to make it easier for a lawyer licensed in one state to
practice law in other states, where he or she is not licensed.93 These pressures,
in turn, may invigorate the proponents of initial bar admission on the national
level, instead of the current state-governed arrangement.94 Regardless of what
one might think about the desirability of such "nationalization" of law practice
and admissions standards, it is undeniable that this would be a major change
to the system currently in place.
A serious, related problem is a move away from judicial regulation of
lawyers. Our system of government is based on a separation of powers, where
each of the three branches of government has its role to play. An independent
judiciary is a key part of the balance of the branches. The persons who make
the laws are not supposed to be the same ones who interpret and apply them
in our court system. Lawyers, as "officers of the court," are an integral part
of the court system. Lawyers often challenge government action, including
laws passed by the legislative branch. Lawyers must have a measure of
independence in order to be able to do this effectively-which is why they are
typically regulated by the judiciary of each state, rather than directly by the
state legislature.
The Act, and the SEC rules it has spawned, are a challenge to continued
judicial regulation of lawyers. The SEC has taken the position that its rules
trump state ethics codes, despite the lack of any clear preemption in the Act
itself. This puts lawyers in the awkward, dangerous position of being
regulated by an entity other than that which licensed them to practice law.
The SEC essentially acts as a prosecutorial body but at the same time
regulates the conduct of the lawyers who are defending their clients in cases
brought by the SEC-to the obvious detriment of the lawyers' clients. It is
inappropriate to use regulatory power over lawyers for this purpose.
92. For a discussion of "nationalization" in the area of legal ethics, see Fred C. Zacharias,
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REV. 335 (1994).
93. For current information on the movement towards easing the barriers to multijurisdictional
practice, see Report of the Commission on Multo'urisdictional Practice, 2002 A.B.A. MULTIJURISDIC-
TIONAL PRACTICE REP. 6-5, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-home.html. See also http://www.
crossingthebar.com. Regarding Florida's proposals in this area, see Report of the Special Commission on
the Multijurisdictional Practice of Law, 2002 FLA. BAR ASS'N MULTUURISDICTIONL PRACTICE REP. 03,
available at http://www.flabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/99BAE490DC714F6E85256
DO10066CD5B/$FILE/mjpfinalrptO3.pdfOpenElement (each last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
94. See generally Carol Needham, Splitting Bar Admission Into Federal and State Components:
National Admission for Advice on Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 453 (1997).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted as a response to serious problems
of corporate wrongdoing. This goal is laudable, of course. Like many
positive goals, however, this one is subject to the "law of unintended
consequences." The Act contains varied measures aimed at publicly traded
companies and the officers, directors, employees, auditors, and lawyers of
those companies. Lawyers and bar organizations must carefully scrutinize the
regulations already adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
pursuant to the Act's directives, because the confidentiality disclosures urged
by the SEC may be at odds with the rules governing lawyer conduct in
individual states. Moreover, the Commission's assessment of the non-affect
of such disclosures on the attorney-client and work product privileges is
questionable, to say the least. The Commission's proposed "noisy with-
drawal rule," if enacted, could raise even more serious concerns in these areas.
All of these developments are likely to drive a wedge of suspicion and distrust
between lawyers and clients, making it more difficult for lawyers to help
ensure their clients' compliance with the law. This, in turn, will ultimately
hurt the public that relies on compliance by corporate issuers of securities.
The fallout from the Act has affected other aspects of lawyer conduct
regulation. Most notably, the American Bar Association has amended 2 of its
key Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality
and Rule 1.13 concerning representation of corporate clients) to more closely
conform to the dictates of the Act and the related SEC regulations. State bars
whose rules differ from the ABA's models are likely to follow suit and revise
their rules as well. Other consequences of the Act may include expanded
lawyer liability on both civil and criminal fronts. In the final analysis, the Act
and its related developments may change the bar admission and lawyer
regulation models to those consistent with a "nationalized" law practice that
is subject to legislative, rather than judicial, oversight. All lawyers, not just
those who represent publicly traded companies, will be well advised to closely
follow these developments.
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